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AVOIDING WAR IN KASHMIR
Wthe current simmering conflict over Kashmir lead
to another subcontinental war? This complex question has
plagued India-Pakistan relations since both countries gained
independence in 1947, and over the past year tensions in the
area have risen sharply. Continuing border skirmishes
threaten an already precarious situation, in which interna-
tional and domestic politics are intertwined with the passions
of rival ethnic, religious and partisan interests.
Three decades ago concerned diplomats in capitals near and
far were acutely sensitive to the stresses of Kashmir. The
United States, the Soviet Union and, at times, China were all
engaged at varying levels of intensity; superpower rivalries
focused on Kashmir, which sometimes stood as a surrogate for
larger global interests.
Now the global situation has altered, even as the basic
tensions of Kashmir remain the same. Washington, Moscow
and, to a certain extent, Beijing share common interests in
ensuring that the two belligerent nations of the subcontinent
do not inadvertently stumble into a major conflagration that
neither India nor Pakistan could afford, and that could even
lead to nuclear escalation.
A new generation of policymakers has lost its predecessor's
sensitivity to the Kashmir conflict, as other world crises have
competed for attention. Now the fashioning of an American
policy appropriate to this potentially volatile situation entails
first of all renewed understanding of the forces that led up to it.
II
The Kashmir conflict is rooted in the colonial history of the
subcontinent. At the time of British withdrawal from the
subcontinent two competing visions of state-creation animated
the nationalist political leaderships. One vision, championed
by Jawaharlal Nehru, was quintessentially secular and demo-
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cratic. This view held that British India's diverse religious,
linguistic and ethnic groups could coexist only under the aegis
of a strong secular state. Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the leader of
the Muslim League, challenged Nehru's vision of a unified
Indian subcontinent. Jinnah contended that the Muslims of
the subcontinent constituted a nation separate from the rest of
(Hindu) India, with a distinct religious heritage and markedly
different social customs. He also argued that the Muslim
minority would be discriminated against in a predominantly
Hindu state.
Despite various last-minute efforts by the Indian National
Congress and the Muslim League, as well as the British
government, continued unity of the subcontinent proved
unattainable. As British withdrawal approached, a complex
formula was created for the division of the area. Contiguous
Muslim-majority states under the direct rule of the British
crown would become Pakistan, with the border states of
Punjab and Bengal being divided. The real problem arose with
the disposition of the so-called princely states. Nominally
independent, the rulers of these states, some 565 in number,
recognized the British crown to be the paramount power in
South Asia. With British withdrawal the doctrine of para-
mountcy lapsed. Several of the princely potentates, especially
Maharaja Hari Singh of Kashmir, had harbored visions of
independence with British decolonization. Lord Mountbatten,
under pressure from Nehru and others in the Indian nation-
alist movement, dashed their hopes. In the closing days of
British rule he insisted that they could not declare indepen-
dence, but must join either India or Pakistan.
Kashmir posed a unique problem. Led by a Hindu monarch,
but composed of a predominantly Muslim population, Kash-
mir was contiguous to Pakistan. Maharaja Singh's desire for an
independent Kashmir was unacceptable to both Nehru and
Jinnah. Pakistan asserted a moral claim to Kashmir based on
the state's Muslim-majority population and borders, which
abutted what would become Pakistan's western wing. What
complicated the picture was the existence of a popular, dem-
ocratic and secular movement in the valley. This movement,
known as the Kashmir National Conference, was led by a
dynamic young Muslim, Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah. As the
maharaja waffled on the question of accession to India or
Pakistan, Pakistani troops disguised as tribesmen joined local
Pathan tribesmen and attacked some of the western border
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areas of Kashmir. In a panic the maharaja sought the assist-
ance of India's newly formed government to ward off the
marauders. Nehru promptly agreed to provide assistance but
only after Kashmir formally acceded to the Indian Union.
The introduction of Indian troops into the Kashmir valley
following the accession led to war with Pakistan in 1947. The
war saw the introduction of the regular Pakistani army in
support of the so-called irregular Azad ("Free") Kashmir
forces. India stopped the Pakistani advance but not before
Pakistan had occupied the northwestern portion of Kashmir.
With the expectation that multilateral intervention might lead
to a resolution of the conflict in its favor, India referred the
issue to the United Nations. The Indian government de-
manded an immediate withdrawal of Pakistani troops from
northwestern Kashmir, a return to a climate of normalcy in the
region, and preparations for a plebiscite to ascertain the views
of the Kashmiris on the question of accession. Pakistan, while
supporting the plebiscite, refused to withdraw its troops from
northwestern Kashmir. The United Nations did manage to
obtain a ceasefire, which went into effect on January 1, 1949.
Despite subsequent U.N. efforts, India and Pakistan continue
to adhere to those positions, discouraging multilateral resolu-
tion of the Kashmir conflict.
With neither side accepting the other's position, both have
sought to absorb their respective portions of Kashmir. The
Pakistani-held territory was provisionally integrated into the
Pakistani state, as were the Northern Areas that abut the
People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union. Pakistan has
directly administered the Northern Areas since their creation
in the early 1950s. A cabinet-level officer, the minister of
Kashmir affairs, is responsible for the political oversight of this
territory. The remainder of Pakistani-held Kashmir is known
as Azad Kashmir. Nominally, Pakistan still insists that the issue
of Kashmir be resolved through a U.N.-supervised plebiscite.
On the Indian side, the state of Kashmir was also accorded
special status under Article 370 of the Indian constitution.
Among other matters it allows only native Kashmiris to own
immovable property in Kashmir.
As its disillusionment with the U.N.-sponsored negotiations
grew, India gradually moved to extend its administrative
control over Kashmir. Local elections were held in 1951,
providing Sheikh Abdullah's Kashmir National Conference an
overwhelming victory. Subsequently in 1953 the National
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Conference split over issues of both policy and personality. At
that time one of Abdullah's lieutenants, Bakshi Ghulam Mo-
hammed, took control of the party and the government.
Bakshi's rise to power saw the beginning of Abdullah's trou-
bles. Abdullah, in an attempt to extract greater resources from
New Delhi, had made a series of inflammatory statements
about Kashmir's future within India. Bakshi, with obvious
encouragement from New Delhi, had Abdullah imprisoned.
Pakistan protested Abdullah's incarceration, but their objec-
tions had little impact on India. Remonstrations by Kashmiris,
however, led Pakistani officials to conclude incorrectly that
local support existed for a Pakistani-sponsored insurgency.
III
Numerous factors prompted Pakistan's military ruler, Pres-
ident Mohammed Ayub Khan, to reassess Pakistan's Kashmir
policy in the early 1960s. The failure of the U.N. negotiations,
New Delhi's steady efforts to integrate Kashmir into its terri-
tories, and India's substantial rearmament program (begun
after the disastrous border war with China in 1962) made
military action to obtain Kashmir seem the only option.
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, then a rising young politician (and father
of the recently deposed Pakistani prime minister, Benazir
Bhutto), in all likelihood prodded Khan to make that reap-
praisal. From the standpoint of Pakistan's leadership it must
have appeared that the "window of opportunity" to settle the
Kashmir issue on favorable terms was rapidly closing. Declin-
ing international interest in the issue coupled with India's
growing military strength would render chimerical future
efforts to wrest Kashmir from India.
Before embarking on a full-scale operation in Kashmir,
Pakistan tested Indian resolve in border skirmishes in January
1965 in an area known as the Rann of Kutch, in the western
Indian state of Gujarat. The Indians, unwilling to be drawn
into a major military conflagration over non-strategic territory,
sought a quick ceasefire and referred the issue to the Interna-
tional Court of Justice. Both Khan and Bhutto construed
India's response as a sign of weakness, clearly the wrong
inference.
Shortly after the Kutch episode, riots erupted in Kashmir
with the theft of a sacred Muslim relic, the Hazaratbal, a hair of
the Prophet Mohammed. The local government was able to
restore order but not before considerable havoc had been
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wreaked throughout the valley. The Pakistani leadership con-
strued this breakdown in public order as an indication of
popular discontent against the Indian government, another
mistake in judgment.
These two flawed inferences led Pakistani decision-makers
to develop a two-phased plan to seize Kashmir by force
(Operation Gibraltar). In the first phase Pakistani troops
disguised as local tribesmen would cross the porous frontier
and foment an insurgency in the border areas of the state. In
the second phase Pakistani troops taking advantage of the
prevailing chaos would then invade and seize the state in a
short sharp war, then call for a ceasefire and appeal to the
international community to hold a plebiscite to determine
Kashmir's future.
The Pakistani strategy went awry at the outset. As the
infiltration started, the local Kashmiri populace proved to be
singularly uncooperative and, in fact, turned the infiltrators
over to the authorities. Despite the collapse of this first phase,
Pakistan nevertheless decided to attack Kashmir in early
September 1965. To the surprise of Ayub Khan, the Indians
not only put up a vigorous defense but crossed the ceasefire
line in Kashmir and the recognized Indian-Pakistani interna-
tional boundary to the south. Under considerable pressure
from the international community, including a U.S. arms
embargo on the warring parties, the war was brought to a close
within a few weeks.
Owing to its growing commitments in Vietnam, Washington
did not seek to involve itself in the resolution of this conflict.
American abstention enabled the Soviets to step into the
breach to play the role of honest broker. At Tashkent in
January 1966 leaders from India and Pakistan met to discuss a
possible resolution to the Kashmir dispute. Both parties made
some important concessions, consenting to give up territory
seized in the conflict and to return to the status quo ante.
India's prime minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, died while in
Tashkent hours after signing the agreement; he was thus
spared criticism about its terms. Ayub Khan, however, faced a
fierce attack from domestic opponents, notably Bhutto. Griev-
ances about the Tashkent agreement coupled with other
domestic problems, particularly lagging economic growth, led
to Ayub's overthrow in 1969 in a military coup.
In 1971 war between India and Pakistan once again
erupted. While one of the fronts involved Kashmir in the west,
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the bulk of the fighting was confined to Pakistan's eastern
wing. The precipitant of this war was the failure of Bhutto and
the military regime of General Yahya Khan to reach an accord
with Bengali nationalists in East Pakistan following popular
elections in 1970. The political deadlock resulted in a grisly
military crackdown in East Pakistan, leading to the flight of
some 9.8 million people into India. After some internal debate
the Indian government decided that it was cheaper to resort to
war than to absorb the refugees into India's already troubled
eastern region. The 1971 war resulted in the breakup of
Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh, but Kashmir saw
only limited military conflict.
Indira Gandhi and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto met in 1972 at the
Indian hill resort of Simla and signed an accord that had
far-reaching implications for the future of the Kashmir dis-
pute. The second paragraph of the agreement stated that "the
two countries are resolved to settle their differences by peace-
ful means through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful
means mutually agreed upon between them."'
The Indian government views this paragraph as a clear
indication that the two sides agreed to settle the Kashmir
dispute without external intervention. The Pakistani leader-
ship, however, contends that this is a narrow reading of the
text and that acceptance of such an interpretation would
denigrate its national sovereignty. Particular interpretations of
the treaty are really partisan exercises: India wants a strict
interpretation to prevent an internationalization of the Kash-
mir dispute; Pakistan wants to focus international attention on
Kashmir.
Iv
The international level is only one dimension of the Kash-
mir conflict; domestic politics plays an equally important role.
At the most general level, the uprisings in Kashmir since the
fall of 1989 can be seen as a part of a second wave of
ethnolinguistic assertion that has swept India over the past
decade. The first wave of ethnic subnationalism manifested
itself in the early 1950s. The Linguistic Reorganization Act,
which divided substantial portions of the country on the basis
Agreement on Bilateral Relations Between the Governments of India and Pakistan,
paragraph two; signed at Simla, July 2, 1972. Emphasis added.
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of dominant language groups, largely addressed the needs of
the time.
This second wave of ethnolinguistic assertion stems in large
measure from the very success of India's "positive discrimina-
tion" (i.e., affirmative action) policies. Disenfranchised minor-
ities have entered the political arena through increased access
to education and employment, generating a backlash from
segments of Hindu India. This resentment against the political
success of minorities has perhaps been most pronounced in
northwestern India, where Hindus live cheek-by-jowl with
large numbers of minorities, particularly Muslims. As ethnic
and communal passions have led to riots and sporadic vio-
lence, minority communities have tended to close ranks. This
phenomenon has been particularly marked among younger
members of the community, those seeking entry into the
competitive marketplaces of education and employment. In
particular, the most militant and fundamentalist organization,
the Hezb-ul-Mujahideen, draws the bulk of its support from
young, educated Kashmiri Muslims.
The immediate precipitants of the ongoing crisis lie both in
Kashmir's domestic politics and in its relations with India's
central government. The steady organizational decline in the
1980s of the nationally dominant Congress (I) Party saw the
concomitant regionalization of Indian politics. Nevertheless,
under the leadership of Mrs. Gandhi and her son, Rajiv, who
took command after her death, the party sought to make
inroads in states where it lacked a substantial constituency. To
this end the party forged dubious alliances with local notables,
often to the detriment of the latter.
The Congress (1)/Kashmir National Conference alliance of
1986 was one such example. This arrangement of convenience
reduced Farooq Abdullah, the son of the legendary Sheikh
Abdullah, to the status of a mere stalking horse for the
Congress (I) Party in Kashmir. Furthermore the Kashmir
assembly elections of 1987 were marked by chicanery and
deceit on a scale not witnessed in recent years in India. Several
important consequences ensued from this flawed election.
First, the coalition that came to power lacked popular legiti-
macy. Second, the willingness of the Congress (I) Party to
resort to unfair electoral practices to capture power in Kash-
mir convinced Kashmiris of the reckless disregard that the
national government had for democratic procedures and for
the principles of federalism. Finally, with the channels of
64 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
democratic protest blocked, the dissidents in the Kashmir
valley felt that they had little choice but to resort to other
means.
By the end of the 1980s a confluence of events caused
discontent in Kashmir to reach dangerously high levels. The
climate of regional and ethnic assertion that had been building
in India and Kashmir combined with the corruption of the
electoral process in Kashmir, which choked off the only viable
political outlet for the forces that had been steadily gathering
steam. Additionally the abject failure of Farooq Abdullah's
government to promote economic development in the state
provided the catalyst for unrest. As swelling numbers of
college-educated Kashmiris discovered bleak employment
prospects, their anger and frustration turned against what
they correctly perceived to be a corrupt and insensitive regime.
Even as recently as a year ago, however, careful administra-
tive and political actions might have defused the oncoming
crisis. In a recently published internal memorandum, former
Kashmiri Governor Jagmohan repeatedly warned then Prime
Minister Rajiv Gandhi not only about the growth of militant
sentiment but of a significant rise in violent incidents in the
valley. The central government, wracked with allegations of
bribery over the acquisition of the Swedish Bofors field gun
for the Indian Army and gearing up for a national election
later in the year, was preoccupied and did little to heed these
timely warnings. A combination of the central government's
distracted stance and what an internal memo describes as the
"total inaction, unbelievable incompetence, widespread cor-
ruption and passive connivance" of the Farooq Abdullah
regime allowed the insurgency to flourish.
2
v
Three principal umbrella groups in Kashmir are involved in
the recent uprisings. Several dozen loosely allied organizations
operate under their aegis. One group, composed of Muslim
fundamentalists, is pro-Pakistani in orientation and has links
with the fundamentalist Pakistani party Jammait-i-Islami. The
organizations allied to the fundamentalist cause are the Mus-
lim Students Federation, the Islami-Jammiat-Tulba and the
Hezb-ul-Mujahideen. The second umbrella group is tied to the
2 Jagmohan, as quoted by Inderjit Badhwar, "Inexplicable Neglect," India Today, Feb. 28,
1990, p. 24.
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Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, which is the oldest of
the secessionist organizations, having been established in 1965
during the border war. Allied with the JKLF are the Mahaz-i-
Azadi, the Kashmir Students Liberation Front and the Kash-
mir Mujahideen Liberation Front. These organizations nomi-
nally share the JKLF credo; they do not wish to merge with
Pakistan but seek to create a separate state of Kashmir. The
third group is the Jammu and Kashmir People's League,
which has an explicitly pro-Pakistani orientation.
The vast majority of the members of these organizations are
young and many are college educated. Estimates of their
numbers vary widely. Published assessments put the figure of
active membership at about 5,000, but Indian intelligence
sources repeatedly claim that at least an equal number are in
Pakistan and are seeking to cross the border. This latter figure,
however, is difficult to verify. Reliable sources point out that,
owing to ideological differences and a diffused command-and-
control structure, these groups frequently work at cross-
purposes. Nevertheless it cannot be disputed that they have
successfully undermined any semblance of civilian authority in
the Kashmir valley.
Over the past year, India has repeatedly accused Pakistan of
aiding and abetting the insurgency in Kashmir. Pakistan has of
course formally denied the charges. In this respect it is worth
emphasizing that the roots of the current crisis are essentially
indigenous. Incontrovertible evidence of direct Pakistani in-
volvement in the training and arming of the insurgents is hard
to establish. It is nevertheless likely that at minimum Pakistan
is passively involved in the insurgency. International press
reports, for example, have pointed to the existence of sanctu-
aries for the insurgents in Azad Kashmir.3 Compelling re-
gional issues also provide certain groups in Pakistan further
incentive for involvement in Kashmir. Pakistan's Inter-Service
Intelligence agency has promoted the interests of the Hezb-i-
Islami, a fundamentalist group in Afghanistan led by Gulbud-
din Hekmatyar- Hekmatyar's links to other local fundamen-
talist groups, as well as his stated disenchantment with India's
Afghan policy, suggest that he may well be, with IsI's acquies-
cence, providing aid and comfort to the insurgency.
Pakistani leaders from Mohammed Ali Jinnah to Benazir
3 Barbara Crossette, "Bhutto Is Dismissed in Pakistan After 20 Months," The New York
Times, Aug. 7, 1990.
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Bhutto have used Pakistan's long-standing claim to Kashmir to
rally domestic support for their own political goals. Although
Pakistan failed in 1971 to hold its two wings together solely on
the basis of the common Islamic religious heritage, Pakistani
leaders still argue that their coreligionists in Kashmir should
be incorporated into Pakistan.
Apart from this historical claim to Kashmir there are other,
more immediate reasons for Pakistani support for the insur-
gency. Prior to her dismissal in August 1990, Bhutto faced a
range of direct challenges-the rising waves of fratricidal
ethnic violence in the province of Sind, frequent threats to her
authority from the military, and a rebellious local leader,
Nawaz Sharif, in Punjab. In her home province of Sind, the
Pakistan People's Party has been engaged in a bloody inter-
necine feud with the Muhajir Quami Mahaz. The MQM draws
its support from "Muhajirs," or Muslim settlers, who came
from India in the wake of the 1947 partition. A recent influx
of Pathans and Punjabis is challenging the long-held Muhajir
dominance of Sind's economy. Also involved in the fray are
well-educated Sindhis who wish to dislodge the Muhajirs from
their positions of privilege. The Pakistani military, under
General Mirza Aslam Beg, had also been somewhat dubious of
Bhutto's credentials as a leader. Finally, and most pertinent to
the Kashmir issue, the prime minister had been quite widely
perceived as being "soft" on India.
Although the emergence of the insurgency in Kashmir
enabled Bhutto to address the entire gamut of challenges to
her domestic position, it was not enough to keep her in power.
Several reasons can be adduced for Bhutto's ouster. Owing to
a range of domestic problems inherited from the previous
regime, Bhutto was unable to make headway with the actual
governance of Pakistan. Among other problems, she was faced
with a thriving drug trade, a concomitant growth in the illegal
small arms industry, and rising tides of ethnic violence, par-
ticularly in Sind. Moreover, her inability to rapidly seize the
initiative in tackling these problems made the military increas-
ingly restive. While she was not overthrown in a military coup,
it is unlikely that President Ghulam Ishaq Khan would have
taken any action contrary to the military's wishes.
In the October 1990 elections Benazir Bhutto, hobbled by
repeated court appearances and unable to campaign effec-
tively, emerged only as a minority leader. The president of the
Islamic Democratic Alliance, Nawaz Sharif, won a majority of
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the national vote and was asked to form the government. It is
highly likely that the army will significantly influence Sharif's
views on the Kashmir issue. In effect, the new government will
not adopt a concilatory posture toward India as regards the
continuing insurgency in Kashmir. The Pakistani government
and the bulk of Pakistan's populace are acutely interested in
keeping the Kashmir issue alive. After all, this is one issue
that unites the Pakistani people, by evoking memories about
Pakistan's troubled relationship with her principal adversary,
India.
VI
Pakistan has little interest, however, in starting a war with
India. Although substantial U.S. assistance to Pakistan has
helped modernize its armed forces during the past decade,
Pakistan's army remains militarily weak in comparison to
India's. Moreover American concerns regarding Pakistan's
nuclear capabilities seriously jeopardize further U.S. support.
Sensing the prevailing mood in Congress, in early October the
administration decided not to seek a waiver under the terms of
the Pressler Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act, which
requires the president to certify that a nation is not actively
acquiring nuclear weapons before it receives U.S. assistance.
Until such a waiver is sought or the appropriate certification
provided, Congress will not continue foreign assistance to
Pakistan. This will have a significant impact on Pakistan, which
relies heavily on U.S. assistance to modernize its army. Last
year alone the United States gave Pakistan $575.9 million in
foreign aid, including $230 million in direct military assist-
ance.
Numerical comparisons of the force deployments of India
and Pakistan must be made carefully. Although the Indian
army is twice the size of Pakistan's, it must patrol India's long
border with China. Entire regiments of the Indian Army are
also tied down intermittently in providing "aid to the civil
power" in the Punjab. India's much longer coastline requires
more naval assets if it is to be properly defended. Finally the
four Indian divisions that were deployed in Sri Lanka under
the aegis of the Indian peacekeeping force are combat-weary
and can hardly be pressed into immediate action.
In spite of these important constraints, India possesses
important advantages. India has twice as many tanks and
artillery pieces as Pakistan, and a nearly two-to-one advantage
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in combat aircraft. Its navy is also substantially larger. If
necessary the Indian navy could again bottle up the Pakistani
fleet, as it did during the 1971 war. These military constraints
are daunting even to Pakistan's risk-prone military.
There are also important political costs to a war. Regardless
of the outcome, a war could spell the end of Pakistan. A
Pakistani defeat could unleash all manner of "fissiparous
tendencies" (to use Selig Harrison's phrase) within the state.
From Sind to Baluchistan, disaffected ethnic groups, sensing a
weakening of central authority, might well step up their
activities, leading to a complete political collapse. Even if
Pakistan were to win the war its fortunes could take an adverse
turn. The military, flush with a victory over the nation's
principal adversary, could decide that it had a right to rule.
The continuing ethnic strife in the country could simply
reinforce such proclivities.
The financial costs of waging a war against India also appear
daunting. In a recent issue of India Today, two Indian journal-
ists estimated that a single day of fighting against Pakistan
would cost India approximately $400 million. Similar analyses
are not available for Pakistan; one can assume that, given
Pakistan's considerably smaller economy, the cost would be
even more onerous. Moreover, with the Soviet withdrawal
from Afghanistan and an overall improvement in U.S.-Soviet
relations, Pakistan's importance to the United States has de-
clined.
Finally, the crisis in the Persian Gulf makes it even more
difficult for Pakistan to seriously contemplate a war with India.
Through its participation in the multilateral gulf force, Paki-
stan has renewed its usefulness to the United States. Starting a
war with India could quickly place strains on this carefully
crafted attempt to continue its ties to the United States.
India, too, can ill afford another war with Pakistan. The
political, military and financial costs all militate against it. Even
the appearance of anything less than complete victory would
bring down V. P. Singh's minority government. The principal
opposition party, the Congress (I), has already accused the
government of pusillanimity in its dealings with Pakistan. If
Indian forces were to suffer a setback on the battlefront, the
Congress (I) Party would unhesitatingly accuse the govern-
ment of having neglected India's security. The Congress (I)
Party could also find support from another quarter. The
strongly chauvinist, pro-Hindu, Bharatiya Janata Party, which
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has long advocated a tough stance against Pakistan, might well
break ranks with the government, leading to its collapse.
A number of domestic factors are also likely to confound
India's war-making capacity at the present time. For the past
several years India has been fighting a terrorist movement in
the Punjab, which shows few signs of receding. In areas of the
Punjab that border Pakistan the writ of the Indian government
has effectively ceased to operate. In previous wars with Paki-
stan, India could always count on the unstinted loyalty of the
populace in these vital border areas. Today, owing to the
deep-seated political divisions in the Punjab, such loyalty can
no longer be taken for granted. Nor for that matter can India
expect Kashmiri Muslims to behave as they did in 1965. Now
the loyalties of many Kashmiri Muslims are questionable,
owing to machinations of the previous state government.
A war between India and Pakistan would also impose
significant strains upon India's foreign relations. In any dis-
pute involving India, the Arab states have traditionally pro-
vided Pakistan diplomatic and moral support. There is little
reason to believe that they would act otherwise in the event of
another war. Apart from diplomatic isolation, the Arab world
could easily impose other material costs on India. Currently
India is in the throes of a severe energy crunch. It is spending
over a third of its foreign-exchange earnings on imported oil,
the bulk of which comes from the Arab world. Incurring Arab
displeasure when oil supplies have already contracted due to
the situation in the Persian Gulf could place India in a most
unenviable position.
India's concerns about another war with Pakistan extend
well beyond the Arab world. At a time of shifting superpower
and regional alignments, India appears to be on the threshold
of improving its relations with the United States. Despite
considerable wrangling earlier this year at the Uruguay Round
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Indian-U.S.
relations have lost much of their rhetorical acrimony.
At a more tangible level, though still small in absolute terms,
American private investment in India is steadily growing. As
the Indian economy matures, it is increasingly turning toward
the United States for collaborative ventures in such areas as
telecommunications, electronics and computer technology.
Furthermore, in the realm of defense technology, India is
seeking U.S. assistance for the manufacture of an advanced-
generation light combat aircraft, a cooperative defense ar-
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rangement made possible under the Reagan administration. A
war on the subcontinent, when both superpowers want to
resolve a range of extant regional conflicts, might well lead to
the revoking of carefully crafted defense and technology
transfer arrangements.
Despite all these arguments, there are grounds for concern
that war could break out. As one U.S. expert recently stated in
an interview with India Today, both nations have moved to
military doctrines of "offensive defense" 4 -in other words, a
strategy of preemption. The Indian defense strategy is now
oriented toward carrying the war into the Pakistani home-
land.5 It is also configured toward promptly suppressing
Pakistani air defense capabilities and the early acquisition of
air superiority. In the future such a strategy could even
incorporate the use of tactical nuclear weapons.
Moreover, if India does not succeed in quelling disturbances
in Kashmir and the Pakistani leadership continues to aggra-
vate the situation, war could take place as a consequence of
inadvertent escalation. Given the existence of preemptive
doctrines and a tense atmosphere along the border, a minor
skirmish could well escalate into a larger war that neither side
envisaged. Such a possibility is especially likely in South Asia,
where military telecommunications, not to speak of civilian
ones, are less than thoroughly reliable, increasing the proba-
bility of escalation due to misperception and miscalculation. In
December 1987 India's military training exercise, "Operation
Brass Tacks," and Pakistan's military exercises, "Flying Horse"
and "Sledgehammer," almost led to a war, owing to poor
communications and mutual misperception of intent. Only
after substantial high-level diplomatic contacts were mutual
suspicions eased.
In recent months high-level Indian and Pakistani officials
have confronted similar issues. In June 1990 India unilaterally
withdrew some armored formations from border areas south
of the Punjab. It also gave Pakistan a seven-point proposal for
4 Stephen Philip Cohen as quoted by Shekhar Gupta and Kanwar Sandhu, "Defense: Are
We Prepared?" India Today, June 30, 1990, p. 31.
5 These offense-oriented doctrines constitute a new danger. Recent scholarship suggests
the proliferation of offensive military doctrines in Europe prior to World War I was a critical
factor in the outbreak of that war. Nevertheless it must be recalled that none of the three
Indo-Pakistani wars or the Sino-Indian War of 1962 started by accident. Each of them began
after a deliberate, well-organized breach of existing borders by one side. See Jack Snyder, The
Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision-Making and the Disasters of 1914, Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1984.
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de-escalating tensions. The proposals largely dealt with a number
of confidence-building measures. They also sought Pakistani
adherence to the Indian interpretation of the Simla agreement.
While confidence-building measures are desirable, they are
peripheral to Pakistan's concerns. Pakistan is primarily inter-
ested in raising the Kashmir crisis in a foreign policy context.
India, however, views the problem as an essentially domestic
one and considers Pakistan only insofar as it may be involved
in supporting the insurgency. Resolving these incongruous
positions will not be easy for either side.
vii
What then is the likely future of the Kashmir crisis? The
most probable scenario is a continuation of the present situa-
tion for the next several months. The Indian government,
through a policy of civilian and military repression, will be able
to restore order, if not law, in Kashmir. In August Indian
security forces arrested much of the JKLF leadership. If it
restores a modicum of order in the state, India will still have to
move rapidly on both domestic and external fronts. Domesti-
cally, it must specify a date for state-level elections and permit
a slow renewal of the legitimate political process. This will not
be an easy task; the Indian government lacks a viable political
center in Kashmir. Nevertheless the alternative to this process
could have important adverse consequences for both the
present regime and the nation.
Domestic attempts to restore popular legitimacy in Kashmir
must be coupled with a willingness to start a dialogue with
Pakistan. This does not entail making territorial concessions-
no government in India could possibly survive such a move.
However, other irritations could be effectively tackled, like the
tense situation along the Siachen Glacier in northern Kashmir,
where Indian and Pakistani troops have been in a standoff for
the past several years. While a resolution of the Siachen issue
will not address Pakistan's present claim to Kashmir, it can
nevertheless serve as a first step toward reaching a more
pragmatic solution to the dispute. One possibility might be a
formal acceptance of the status quo by both sides for the next
twenty or so years, coupled with a "no-war" pact. In effect this
proposal would be the logical successor to the Simla agree-
ment.
The failure to defuse the crisis in Kashmir has important
domestic consequences for India and Pakistan as well as
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ramifications for the entire subcontinent. For Pakistan a con-
tinuing insurgency and concomitant repressive Indian policies
in Kashmir will provide a useful rallying theme for any
regime, civilian or military. It will also provide a constant
temptation to intervene in Kashmir, thereby contributing to
tense Indo-Pakistani relations.
For India, a failure to reach political accommodation in
Kashmir and reliance on the army to maintain public order
could lead to a further erosion of its democratic institutions.
The Indian army has long been apolitical, but it is now being
increasingly called on to restore public order and may not
remain politically neutral for an indefinite future. A continu-
ing insurgency in Kashmir also bodes ill for the secular ethos
of the Indian state. If the tides of Islamic fundamentalist
sentiment do not ebb in Kashmir they may well lead to a spate
of anti-Muslim sentiment throughout northern India. These
two developments could have fundamentally corrosive effects
on the two most important edifices of the Indian polity-
democracy and secularism.
At both regional and international levels this scenario is also
fraught with considerable danger. An extended insurgency in
Kashmir is likely to lead to continuing small-scale border
skirmishes between India and Pakistan with the ever-present
possibility of inadvertent escalation. It may also tempt India to
provide support for Pakistan's own incipient separatist move-
ments in Sind and Baluchistan, leading to a situation of
pervasive instability in an area stretching from Afghanistan to
the Punjab. It would also prevent India from moving ahead
with a settlement of its long-standing border dispute with
China, as this involves portions of Kashmir as well.
VIII
As the United States works to influence the emerging
post-Cold War order, it must consider which political norms it
wishes to encourage. The Kashmir conflict and its resolution
will set important global precedents implicating several issues.
First, there is the question of the proper mechanism for the
resolution of long-standing border disputes. Both Pakistan
and India nominally claim the entire state of Kashmir. Yet the
borders of Kashmir have not been fundamentally altered since
the U.N. ceasefire agreement of 1949. Will the United States
now support attempts to change lines of control that have
remained largely fixed over four decades? And in this context,
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what attitude will it take regarding aid to insurgencies across
national borders?
Second, what stand will the United States adopt on the
proper role of religion in government? Will it support India's
claim that religious differences can be accommodated within
the framework of freedom of worship and the separation of
religion and state? Third, the United States must also consider
the proper unit of self-determination. Will Washington accept
that a culturally diverse polity constitutes an appropriate unit,
provided it adheres to democratic norms not inferior to
practices prevailing in other states in the region? Or will it call
for a stricter test of cultural and religious homogeneity as the
basis for self-determination?
It is also in the U.S. interest to prevent the outbreak of
another war in South Asia. At a time of declining regional
tensions (Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait notwithstand-
ing), a war on the subcontinent would divert U.S. attention
from ongoing attempts to shape a new world order. Another
Indo-Pakistani war would almost inevitably lead to the overt
nuclearization of the subcontinent. Both nations, in all likeli-
hood, already possess crude nuclear forces.6 In 1974 India
demonstrated its capacity to conduct nuclear explosions, while
Pakistani agents have been arrested in the United States in
attempts to export items that could serve as the triggering
devices for nuclear weapons. The overt nuclearization of
either country coupled with emerging ballistic missile capabil-
ities would leave U.S. nonproliferation policy in a shambles.
The United States also needs to consider the possibility that
an Indo-Pakistani conflict may not remain confined to the
subcontinent. Though the possibility of direct Arab interven-
tion is remote, small but significant support may come from
the more conservative members of the Arab world. Their
support could prolong and spread the conflict to the Middle
East, leading to tie prospect of a much wider war. Given the
easing of East-West tensions, it is imperative that the United
States devote comparable attention to the avoidance of a
potential Indo-Pakistani conflict and that both India and
Pakistan work toward a peaceful resolution of the conflict.
6 General Krishnaswami Sundarji, as quoted in an interview with Michael O'Rourke, Far
Eastern Economic Review, Sept. 13, 1990, pp. 24-25.
